

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 07105 01 OF 03 191004Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 /026 W

-----097548 191011Z /12

P R 190929Z AUG 77  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 427  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 7105

EXDIS USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 18, 1977  
(SALT TWO - 1355)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 18, 1977:

SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 18, 1977

I

AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION WILL ADDRESS THE  
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLES XII AND  
XIII--ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND NON-TRANSFER  
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

WE TAKE NOTE OF THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE  
AUGUST 12, 1977 MEETING, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED STATES  
WILL NOT ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS WITH THE INTENTION OF CIRCUMVENTING ITS PROVI-  
SIONS. HERE, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES  
ARE IDENTICAL.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 07105 01 OF 03 191004Z

WE ALSO NOTE THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSAL TABLED  
BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE AUGUST 12, 1977 MEETING, THE  
QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION HAS NOW ENTERED THE PHASE OF  
SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION BY THE DELEGATIONS WITH THE OBJECT OF  
WORKING OUT AGREED PROVISIONS OF INCLUSION IN THE TEXT OF  
THE JOINT DRAFT.

AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE DRAFT OF ARTICLE XII SUBMITTED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, WHICH, MOREOVER, IS INTENDED, IT WAS SAID, TO REPLACE TWO ARTICLES--XII AND XIII-- PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, THE CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES ARE FORMULATED IN A CLEARLY INADEQUATE MANNER.

THE DRAFT OF ARTICLE XII ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, WHICH WAS TABLED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, ALTHOUGH IT IS A CERTAIN STEP FORWARD, IS, NEVERTHELESS, OF A GENERAL, DECLARATORY NATURE. IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT WE DEAL WITH QUESTIONS OF CONSIDERABLY LESSER SIGNIFICANCE IN A FAR MORE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED FASHION, WHILE AS REGARDS SUCH A MAJOR QUESTION, TO WHICH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE U.S. QUITE JUSTIFIABLY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE, EVASIVENESS SUDDENLY APPEARS. THIS IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

THE PROVISION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION, WHOSE PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE A RELIABLE GUARANTEE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, MUST ALSO CONTAIN A CLEARLY FORMULATED INDICATION OF THE SPECIFIC CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THIS OBLIGATION, BEING ASSUMED BY THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 07105 01 OF 03 191004Z

IT IS PRECISELY SPECIFICITY--AND THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT IS CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION'S PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XII--WHICH MAKES THE OBLIGATION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION PURPOSEFUL, UNAMBIGUOUSLY SPECIFYING THE ACTIONS WHICH WILL NOT BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE SIDES, ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT BEING WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED.

AN APPROACH OF THAT KIND WOULD NOT AT ALL TEND TO NARROW THE APPLICATION OF THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD CLEARLY STATE SPECIFICALLY WHAT CONSTRAINTS THE SIDES ARE IMPOSING ON THEMSELVES IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA.

A DETAILED NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION IN ARTICLE XII, IN JURIDICALLY STRICT WORDING, WOULD ALSO BE OF MAJOR POLITICAL IMPORTANCE, TESTIFYING TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING STEPS WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE OBJECTIVES OF STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND TO GIVE THE NEW AGREEMENT THE NECESSARY VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS. THIS WOULD MAKE THE AGREEMENT AUTHORITATIVE AS A MEASURE GENUINELY CURBING AND CONSTRAINING THE ARMS RACE.

THE USSR DELEGATION REAFFIRMS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR

ARTICLE XII, TO THE EFFECT THAT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, EACH SIDE UNDERTAKE NOT TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER.

THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO IS NOT DEALT WITH IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S PROPOSAL TABLED AT THE AUGUST 12, 1977 MEETING. THERE IS NO NEED TO EXPLAIN THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT THIS QUESTION HAS MAJOR INDEPENDENT IMPORTANCE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 07105 02 OF 03 191021Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 /026 W

-----097777 191024Z /12

P R 190929Z AUG 77  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 428  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 GENEVA 7105

EXDIS USSALTTWO

AS ALREADY EMPHASIZED HERE REPEATEDLY, IF A CHANNEL FOR A BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY TRANSFERS TO OTHER STATES WERE LEFT UNBLOCKED, THIS WOULD IN ESSENCE NULLIFY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OTHER MEASURES PROVIDED FOR IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND WOULD IN FACT MEAN UNDERMINING THE AGREEMENT. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE ABILITY TO SPEAK ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS SUDDENLY LOST, AND, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, WHAT MIGHT THIS MEAN? THIS REMINDS ONE OF BUILDING A DAM ACROSS A STREAM IN SUCH A WAY THAT ALL THE DIRECTIONS IN WHICH THE WATER MIGHT FLOW REMAIN UNBLOCKED.

A MUTUAL OBLIGATION, EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES, NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES IS NECESSARY BOTH FOR ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND FOR INCREASING MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., AND IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GENERALLY,

IN SUCH A VITALLY IMPORTANT AREA AS THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

A NON-TRANSFER OBLIGATION, BEING IN ACCORD WITH THE POLICY OF STRENGTHENING THE REGIME OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ADOPTED BY THE USSR AND THE U.S., WOULD BE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 07105 02 OF 03 191021Z

FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO STATES, AS WELL AS THOSE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AS A WHOLE. AND THERE IS ALREADY PRECEDENT FOR THIS IS THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, AS YOU KNOW, SUCH AN OBLIGATION IS RECORDED IN ARTICLE IX OF THE ABM TREATY NOW IN EFFECT.

THEREFORE, THE USSR DELEGATION REAFFIRMS THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT OF ARTICLE XIII, TO THE EFFECT THAT EACH SIDE UNDERTAKE NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES AND NOT ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR, BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THESE ARMS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE OBLIGATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES XII AND XIII APPLY TO THE ARMS COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS BY THE THREE-YEAR PROTOCOL WHICH IS AN INTEGRAL PART THEREOF. THIS COULD BE DRAWN UP, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED STATEMENT.

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMING SUCH OBLIGATIONS ENSUES DIRECTLY FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS AND FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER--THESE ARE MAJOR QUESTIONS TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE, AND THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT CONCEIVE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WITHOUT MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON THIS SCORE, I.E., THOSE UNDER ARTICLE XII, AS WELL AS ARTICLE XIII OF THE JOINT DRAFT.

THE USSR DELEGATION EXPECTS THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL SET FORTH ITS VIEWS ON THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, VIEWS THAT WOULD  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 07105 02 OF 03 191021Z

FACILITATE RESOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS.

THE QUESTION OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF

ARTICLE II, PAR. 5--THE DEFINITION OF LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS  
AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS--OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT PLACE  
AMONG THE QUESTIONS BEING DISCUSSED BY THE DELEGATIONS.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, BOTH SIDES ATTACH MAJOR IMPORTANCE  
TO CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

AT THE JUNE 17, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION TABLED  
A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH, IN PARTI-  
CULAR, TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF THE U.S. SIDE REGARDING  
THE USE OF THE TERM "TYPE OF LAUNCHER" IN THE APPROPRIATE  
CONTEXT.

SINCE THAT TIME A MAJOR STEP HAS BEEN TAKEN IN WORKING  
OUT JOINT PROVISIONS FOR RTICLE II, PAR. 5, FOR INCLUSION  
IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT, IN THE DRAFTING GRUP, SPECIFICALLY.

ONE OF THE QUESTIONS BEING DISCUSSED BY THE DELEGATIONS  
IN CONNECTION WITH REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF  
LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS IS THE  
QUESTION OF WORKING OUT AN AGREED STATEMENT CONCERNING ICBM  
LAUNCHERS IN THE DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK AREAS IN THE USSR,  
AND AT THE MALMSTROM BASE IN THE U.S.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 07105 03 OF 03 191035Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 /026 W

-----097960 191039Z /15

P R 190929Z AUG 77  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 429  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 GENEVA 7105

EXDIS USSALTTWO

THE U.S. DELEGATION IN ITS STATEMENT AT THE JULY 22, 1977  
MEETING RAISED THE QUESTION OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN LAUNCHERS  
OF ICBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS WITHOUT  
SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES, LOCATED IN THE DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK

AREAS.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY STATED ITS CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CONNECTION. IN PARTICULAR, WE STATED THAT IN THE DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK ICBM LAUNCHER AREAS THERE ARE DEPLOYED 60 LAUNCHERS OF RS-18 ICBMS, I.E., OF MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, AND 120 LAUNCHERS OF ANOTHER TYPE, WHICH ARE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

IN ELABORATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS PRESENTED EARLIER, TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

RS-18 MISSILES DIFFER FROM MISSILES OF ANOTHER TYPE DEPLOYED IN THE DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK AREAS, NOT ONLY IN THEIR EXTERNAL APPEARANCE AND DESIGN, BUT ALSO IN THEIR DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHTS. THEREFORE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO STANDARDIZE THE ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS IN THE DERAZHNYA AND  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 07105 03 OF 03 191035Z

PERVOMAYSK AREAS. IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO CONVERT THE LAUNCHERS OF MISSILES OF ANOTHER TYPE IN THESE AREAS FOR RS-18 ICBMS, THAT WOULD REQUIRE A LENGTHY PERIOD OF TIME, MEASURED IN MONTHS, AND THIS CANNOT BE CONCEALED FROM OBSERVATION BY U.S. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS CLARIFICATION PROVIDES ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE IN TERMS OF CLEARLY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS WITHOUT SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES IN THE DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK AREAS.

INASMUCH AS THE SITUATION WHICH HAS EVOLVED IN THESE AREAS, JUST LIKE THAT AT THE MALMSTROM BASE IN THE U.S., IS SPECIAL AND UNIQUE, AND WILL NOT BE REPEATED IN THE FUTURE, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES REGARDING THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN THESE PLACES BE RECORDED IN AN AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 5. THE DRAFT TEXT OF AN AGREED STATEMENT ON THIS SCORE HAS BEEN TABLED AND IS UNDER DISCUSSION.

IN ADDITION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, I HAVE TO STATE THAT THE ANTENNAS OBSERVED BY THE U.S. SIDE AT THE MISSILE COM-0)3XES IN THE DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK AREAS ARE ONE OF THE EXTERNAL DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF LAUNCHERS OF RS-18 ICBMS. THE LAUNCHERS OF THESE ICBMS ARE LOCATED SEPARATELY FROM THE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OF ANOTHER TYPE, WHICH ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

THUS, THE CLARIFICATION PROVIDED CLEARLY INDICATES WHICH ICBM LAUNCHERS IN THE DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK AREAS

QR LAUNCHERS OF RS-18 ICBMS, I.E., OF MISSILES EQUIPPED  
WITH MIRVS. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD THAT  
IT WAS PRECISELY THIS THAT THE U.S. SIDE WAS INTERSTED IN  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 07105 03 OF 03 191035Z

DURING DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION.

THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THIS  
PROVIDES A BASIS FOR REACHING FULL AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS  
OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 5.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE  
U.S. SIDE ON THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS. EARLE

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SPEECHES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MEETINGS, MISSILES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 19-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977GENEVA07105  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770299-1139  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** GENEVA  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t19770845/aaaablpt.tel  
**Line Count:** 349  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 02220358-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 20-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1552328  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 18, 1977 (SALT TWO - 1355) THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MIN  
**TAGS:** PARM, UR, US, (SEMENOV)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/02220358-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009